




REMARKS

ON

AN ADDRESS TO THE MEMBERS OF
THE NEW PARLIAMENT,

ON THE

PROCEEDINGS OF THE COLONIAL DEPARTMENT,

WITH RESPECT TO THE

WEST INDIA QUESTION.

BY

A MEMBER OF THE LATE PARLIAMENT.

LONDON:

JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET.

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REMARKS.

&c.

THE professed object of the writer of this Address is, to impress on the members of the new parliament, that the proceedings of the Colonial Department on the subject of West Indian slavery have been injudicious and unauthorised. The writer commences by quoting the following passage from the speech of Mr. Canning:—"To speak of the difficulties which encompass it, as compared with almost any other question which has ever occupied the attention of parliament, would be to draw but a faint and feeble picture of those difficulties: they are indeed apparent to the most casual observation; but he who has to probe and prove them, for the purpose of applying a remedy, finds them thickening around him at every step, and leaving him frequently nothing but a choice of evils." He then contrasts the conduct of Lord Bathurst with the sentiments con-

tained in that Speech, and remarks, that " This question, however, which Mr. Canning thought " ' great and difficult beyond example,' one almost " beyond the ' power of man,' ' the recasting, as it " were, of a whole generation of mankind,' was " undertaken by the Colonial Department, to " which it more especially belonged, with an apparent innocence of all consciousness of its importance or difficulty."

It is fortunate that there are public documents which will enable any man to put down, conclusively and for ever, this attempt to disconnect the conduct and proceedings of two members of the same cabinet. Can any man, presuming to address the House of Commons, be so utterly ignorant of the course of official proceedings as not to know that, although the details of a measure may be left to the executive department whose business it is to carry them into practical execution, yet the principles upon which any state measure is founded are necessarily the principles of the King's ministers; and that, if the details be shown to be consistent with those principles, the attempt to throw a stigma on a particular department, for executing any great national purpose, must be unworthy of any man who means to deal fairly with the public.

This writer forgets, when he proceeds to detail what he considers to be the blemishes and defects

of the executive proceedings of the Colonial Department, that, when it suits his purpose, he adopts the sentiments of Mr. Canning, and pronounces the duties which were forced on that department to be "great and difficult beyond example," and "almost "beyond the power of man to execute." If, therefore, it were necessary to admit that such blemishes and defects did exist, he himself furnishes an apology for them.

Any person, who should read this pamphlet without previous information, would suppose, that the only information which had ever been afforded by the government to the public, on the subject, was to be found in the official despatches, papers, and documents laid on the table of the House of Commons, for the information of parliament. Does this gentleman forget that he writes his pamphlet in October, 1826, and that, on the 16th of March, 1824, (*that is, nearly two years and a half previously to this publication,*) Mr. Canning addressed the House of Commons, and stated that 'he rose to discharge his duty to the House, both as the mover of the resolutions that were passed on the 16th of May, 1823, and as the organ, in the House of Commons, of the government which undertook to carry the principles of those resolutions into effect ;' and that he then and there pledged himself to give 'a review of the measures that had been adopted, and of the course that had been pursued

by his Majesty's government in obedience to those resolutions*? Does he forget that, at that very period, the order in council for Trinidad was a printed document, in the hands of every member of the House? Does he forget that Mr. Canning did, on that occasion, most eloquently and luminously discuss, in detail, every individual clause of the enactments of that order; that he pointed out their relations, their analogies, their consistency with the resolution to which the House of Commons had unanimously come in the preceding year? And, in the teeth of these notorious facts, does he presume to disconnect Mr. Canning from the measure of the Trinidad order in council? Does he suppose, that that order, with all its accessories, was enacted and passed without the knowledge, consent, and concurrence of the government?—A course was open to him in theory, which, if acted upon, might have been a very fair and legitimate mode of attack. Why did he not attempt to show that the measures of the Colonial Department were not in keeping with the views of government, as illustrated and explained by Mr. Canning, as the organ of the government? If he had been able to maintain such a proposition, there might have been a semblance of argument in his separate attack on the Colonial Department. Is he not aware that, by

* Vide Parliamentary Debates.

inevitable implication, he stamps the West Indian members of the last parliament, as the most ignorant, incautious, and imbecile body of men who ever were got together to represent an interest? If they have omitted to do justice to their own cause, by pointing out the practical defects of those enactments and instructions which for two years and a half have been public documents on the table of the House of Commons, and have remained there without commentary, much less disparagement, where was their sense of public duty—of personal interest, fairly and rationally understood—of manly responsibility,—for who is there that will pretend to deny that they were virtually responsible for the fair interests of the West Indians being duly discussed and understood in parliament? If they have shared the opinions of the writer of this address, how can they reconcile it to themselves not to have had the manliness to avow them? What inference, therefore, is to be drawn from their silence, and from this address-writer's accusations? Why, that his accusations are utterly unfounded; as it is too monstrous to believe that, if they had the shadow of foundation, they would be first communicated to the world in a pamphlet published in October, 1826, when three long sessions of parliament had elapsed without one syllable of a kindred nature being uttered within the walls of parliament.

It is necessary to record that the Trinidad order in council contains the sum and substance of the measures, for the recommendation of which the government, and not any particular department, are responsible. Undoubtedly, a great cry has been excited throughout the West Indies against the whole of that order; but the fact (which no member of parliament will ever venture to deny) is, that nine-tenths of the legislation involved in that order applies to points of pure melioration, which might be carried into full and practical effect, although slavery might continue as a state in the West Indies for ten thousand years. In many of these points, little more has been done than confirming, by law, that which all but uniformly existed in practice in particular places. But there is one class of clauses, and only one, of that order, which is of a perfectly different nature; and those clauses have been designated the compulsory manumission clauses. In that clause, unquestionably, is involved the principle of contingent and ultimate emancipation. If it be inquired, how happened it that such clauses were introduced into the Trinidad order?—that query may be answered by another query,—how happened it that the West Indian members of the House of Commons unanimously consented (for the absence of their dissent, under the circumstances which attended those resolutions, was equivalent to actual consent) to a resolution, “That it was expe-

"dient to adopt such effectual and decisive measures for meliorating the condition of the slave population in his Majesty's colonies;"—aye, and not only to adopt, but "enforce" such measures "in a determined and persevering, though at the same time judicious and temperate manner," as would effect—what purpose?—the mitigation of the evils of slavery?—as would remove the odious imputation of inhumanity adhering to the West Indian planters, so generally prevalent at that time throughout England, whether true or false? *No: to enforce such measures as might "prepare them for a participation in those civil rights and privileges which are enjoyed by other classes of his Majesty's subjects."**

What! was the intellect of the West Indian members of the House of Commons who were pre-

* To show that these resolutions have been fairly quoted, they are here copied:—"First, that it is expedient to adopt effectual and decisive measures for ameliorating the condition of the slave population in his Majesty's colonies.—Second, that through a determined and persevering, but at the same time judicious and temperate, enforcement of such measures, this House looks forward to a progressive improvement in the character of the slave population, such as may prepare them for a participation in those civil rights and privileges which are enjoyed by other classes of his Majesty's subjects.—Third, that this House is anxious for the accomplishment of this purpose at the earliest period that shall be compatible with the well being of the slaves themselves, with the safety of the colonies, and with a fair and equitable consideration of the interests of private property."

sent on that day, so obtuse, that they could not understand the meaning of those words, and that they supposed that no measures could be consequent on those resolutions, which would ultimately have a tendency to elevate the slave population into a state of freedom? Common sense answers, or even common instinct would answer, that they must have known perfectly well the meaning of the words; and that they must have known that, if the executive government were compelled to carry into effect those resolutions of parliament, their legislation must involve some principle under which salvery might ultimately but slowly and safely evaporate.

But supposing it to be admitted, for the sake of argument, that they were all taken by surprise, and that they were not in the least degree aware of the important bearing of those resolutions, (and it must here be repeated, that it is to the compulsory manumission clause alone that the following observations will be directed)—In March, 1824, (as already stated,) the Trinidad order in council was laid on the table of the House of Commons. Let the words be duly weighed, which Mr. Canning employed in commenting on the compulsory manumission clauses. Adverting to the other parts of the order, he says, “By this process, and by these degrees, may the
“slave be gradually fitted for the last grand consum-
“mation of benefit, the power of acquiring his free-

" dom. Heretofore, the restraints on granting ma-
 " numissions were extremely numerous ; but those
 " are now considerably reduced : several taxes and
 " imposts have been removed in different colonies ;
 " and in others, a like disposition has been mani-
 " fested. The order in council, however, goes be-
 " yond what has been hitherto at all generally prac-
 " tised in the colonies. It ordains," (and be it re-
 " membered, this order in council was to be the
 " model of the whole West Indies,) " that a negro
 " who has acquired sufficient property shall, under
 " certain guards and regulations therein set forth,
 " be entitled to purchase his own freedom, the free-
 " dom of his wife, or that of his children. I have
 " thus, Sir, stated to the House the provisions of
 " the order in council. I know that, with respect
 " to the last point—namely, the purchase of free-
 " dom—great prejudice, great dislike, great appre-
 " hension prevails. I am far from saying that it is
 " not a perplexing question ; but the principle has
 " been admitted, to a certain extent, in St. Kitts,
 " and also in Trinidad. No principle can be con-
 " sidered as impracticable which has, even in a
 " single instance, been voluntarily admitted in the
 " West Indies. It is astonishing how much good
 " might be done, by merely collecting and bringing
 " to bear on one society, all the beneficial regula-
 " tions which are scattered through the different
 " colonies. . . It is the intention of the government,

“ Sir, after having established the system which I
 “ have explained in Trinidad, to extend it to the
 “ other colonies in which the power of the crown is
 “ unshackled. The same instructions which have
 “ been sent to Trinidad are to be forwarded to St.
 “ Lucia. The only difference will be, that, as in
 “ Trinidad they are grafted on the Spanish law, in
 “ St. Lucia the machinery of the French law will be
 “ employed for carrying them into operation. *It is*
 “ *intended also to extend the experiment to Demerara*
 “ *and its dependencies, where, indeed, it would have*
 “ *been first tried, but for the intervention of the un-*
 “ *fortunate occurrences which have lately taken place*
 “ *in that colony.*”

On the 14th of July, 1824, Lord Bathurst addressed a letter to the Duke of Manchester, and other governors in the West Indies, from which the following is an extract :—

“ I have the honour of inclosing to your Grace a
 “ copy of the order in council for the improvement
 “ of the condition of the slaves in Trinidad.”

Lord Bathurst states, that he does so for the purpose of enabling the governors “ to bring more completely under the consideration of the legislature, at their ensuing meeting, *the whole of the measures* which his Majesty’s government have in contemplation for the melioration of the state of the slave population.”

And the letter concludes by saying, “ Your Grace

“ will readily anticipate the serious extent of the
 “ disappointment which his Majesty’s government
 “ will experience, if, unfortunately for their best in-
 “ terests, as well as for the cause of humanity, the
 “ Assembly of Jamaica shall reject the substance of
 “ these regulations, which, they must be aware,
 “ have received the sanction of Parliament and the
 “ general approbation of the country.”

This letter was laid upon the table of the House of Commons in the spring of 1825, as appears on the paper itself. Nearly two sessions have therefore elapsed, since every West Indian member of the House of Commons was made fully aware of the fact; and yet not one single syllable has been uttered in parliament by any individual member connected with the West Indian interest, which went to assert that the Trinidad order in council, to which Lord Bathurst referred the Duke of Manchester as a model, for the purpose of his endeavouring to persuade the Assembly to adopt its substance, did not deserve the general approbation of the country.

The object of the writer of this “ Address” is, to assure the members of the House of Commons that the Trinidad order did deserve the disapprobation of every fair-thinking man. Again, therefore, it must be repeated,—that unless the writer of this address intends to tamper with the subject, which

cannot be supposed, and to palm on the present House of Commons opinions which he himself does not entertain, he really means to cast a censure upon the West Indian representatives in the last parliament.

The writer of the Address speaks of Lord Bathurst's despatches as being unconciliatory. Now in what manner does Lord Seaford express himself with respect to these despatches ?

“ Having referred (he says) to the disposition
 “ and feelings of the white inhabitants of the West
 “ Indies, it would be disingenuous in me not to
 “ state, that I regret exceedingly the temper in
 “ which the suggestions of the government have been
 “ received in some of the colonies. But after making
 “ that admission, I must beg leave to call upon the
 “ House, in judging of the conduct of the colonies,
 “ to take into their consideration the impressions,
 “ the feelings, and the circumstances under which
 “ they acted. It is evident that they acted under
 “ the impression that a threat was implied in the
 “ *resolutions of this House*, of enforcing the measures
 “ there referred to by means which they considered
 “ as interfering with their constitutional rights, as
 “ invading their property, and likely to disturb the
 “ internal tranquillity. Nobody can be less dis-
 “ posed than I am to argue that such is a correct
 “ understanding of those resolutions. On the con-

“trary, I consider it to be an understanding not
 “justified by the construction of the words, and
 “practically contradicted by the course adopted by
 “the House ; and it has since received a still more
 “satisfactory contradiction in the speech delivered
 “by my right honourable friend, *as well as by the*
 “*course now adopted by the government.*”

Any person who professes to have given his attention to the history of these late proceedings, could not fail to have perceived at an early period the full scope and bearing of what are called the “compulsory manumission clauses” in the Trinidad order. The West Indian Members of Parliament could not, with even a pretext of plausibility, plead ignorance of their nature and tendency. In the *Quarterly Review*, No. 60, published at the end of 1824 *, the principle which is involved in them was explained in the most clear and simple manner. That review led to a polemical controversy between writers assuming the names of Anglus and Vindex, in which that principle was more fully amplified and explained †. Many other publications may probably be quoted, in which the subject was equally discussed, since the publication of No. 60 of the *Quarterly Review*.

It may, however, not be inconvenient here to recite the question shortly and succinctly, as an useful prelude to any observations that may be

* Vide Appendix A.

† Vide Appendix B.

made as to the course which the government have pursued. In 1823, very strong feelings pervaded the country on the subject of West Indian slavery ; and it is an historical fact, (whether it now be denied or admitted,) that the West Indians in this country felt considerable alarm at the extent and energy of those feelings. Is it possible for any man to produce an argument more unfair than is contained in the following passage of the Address?—

“ The excitement spread throughout the country
 “ was produced by a party that had avowed by
 “ their organ that they could do any thing with
 “ government, ‘ by saving them the trouble of
 “ thinking ;’ and what could be a more powerful
 “ auxiliary to the views of that party than raising
 “ an excitement, to make it appear that the country
 “ was on their side?”

The inference here is, that the abolitionists dictated the measure of the Trinidad order in council, because it appears on the showing of the abolitionists, that the government were ready to do anything, if they could but be preserved from the trouble of thinking. On what authority does this statement rest?—on a letter addressed by Mr. Macaulay—not to the Duke of Gloucester, as is most scandalously mis-stated in the “ Address”—but to Mr. Ludlam, the governor of Sierra Leone, in the year 1807. A petulant opinion, expressed in a private letter by

a professed abolitionist, sixteen years before Mr. Buxton's motion, is brought forward, *without specification of date or circumstance*, as *if it had* referred to the government of 1823. The Letter in question was written with reference to circumstances at Sierra Leone. It is brought forward by this writer, as a proof of the concurrence of the *present* government in the views of the *present* abolitionists; whereas it is a letter written *nineteen years ago*, with reference to the settlements on the coast of Africa, and imputing to the government of that time, coldness and indifference on the subject of those settlements! Now, what is the real truth with respect to the state of feeling that existed in this country in 1823? The idea of slavery, under any qualifications, must be, and ought to be, repulsive to the feelings of Englishmen; but if an Englishman is apprized that his pocket must be appealed to in the cause of freedom, under any circumstances, whether in the case of Europeans or Africans, Christians or infidels, he has a natural degree of caution, quite compatible with very genuine sentiments of humanity, which induces him to pause before he proffers his donation for the gratification of his abstract wish and feeling. Every man of common honesty will allow, that every week, if not every day, brings before him cases of distress, in which misfortune might be mitigated and injury repaired, by pecuniary contribution, but where a sense of prudence at least

regulates the course of his charities, and limits them rather by his means than by his feelings. In the year 1823, it is an absolute and undeniable fact, that the people of this country were taught to believe that a slave, if made free *, would necessarily, by virtue of that increased elasticity of spirit and power of acquiring personal advantage which belongs to a state of freedom, execute the duties of a labourer in the sugar-colonies, more effectually than he would do as a slave, receiving, of course, that fair remuneration, as wages, which the agricultural labouring poor in this country receive, as a matter of course, in return for their bodily exertions; and it was intimated that the wages which would be sufficient to induce a slave, when made free, to work diligently and continuously for hire, would be no more, or little more, than the expense now incurred by the proprietor of a slave in his maintenance and support from infancy to age. It was at the same time stated, that the West Indians had such an affection and obstinate adherence to this accursed system of slavery, with all its attendant train of coercion and tyranny, that they were doggedly unwilling to relax any link in this chain of restraint, and that they were contumaciously blind to the advantages which would arise to them from the abolition of a state of slavery. Since the period of 1823, more attention has been directed to the

* Vide Appendix C.

subject, more documents collected, more information combined ; and it is not too much to say, that considerable doubts are entertained as to the accuracy and truth of the propositions which have been quoted above. The valuable Reports of Major Moody tend to establish one simple fact, which may be expressed shortly and popularly in the following proposition ; viz. that, under the present circumstances of the West Indies, especially as to thinness of population, field-slaves, when made free, will not be disposed to work for wages, so as to keep at par the present production of sugar. At first, some abolition writers absolutely denied this proposition *. They then appear prepared to admit it *in toto*, and to inveigh against the cruelty of a system which *has been shown* to be *only* compatible with coercion ; and they come to the unqualified conclusion that that system ought to be abolished. Finally, they appear to infer that every person who has either contended for that which they now admit, or who makes the same admission, but is not prepared to come to the same unqualified conclusion,

* Vide Appendix C. containing (among other extracts from the writings of abolitionists) an extract from the " Substance of the Debate in the House of Commons, on the 15th May, 1823," in which it is first contended that emancipation *would not be injurious to the planters*, as the free negroes would work for wages, and then, the argument is concluded by an admission that "*We may have less sugar from the West Indies*, but we shall have it from some other quarter."

must be a shameful apologist for slavery ; whereas the true inference to be drawn from this admission is, not that slavery should be continued, or that slavery should be instantly abolished, but that in equity it cannot be abolished, without compensation to those whose fortunes will, according to this admission, be ruined by the abolition. The production of sugar (no matter, for the purpose of this argument, whether under circumstances of greater or less coercion) was practically secured to the West Indian, under an average system of slave cultivation, prior to the resolutions of 1823. This fact cannot be controverted by any expression of horror with respect to slavery as a system. Those resolutions pledged the country to "an equitable consideration of the interests" of the planters' property. Now, if any measure consequent on those resolutions (not being merely of a humane and meliorating nature, *for which no compensation can be due*) shall be found to diminish production, the equitable compensation which was pledged in the resolutions, and *involved in the phrase above quoted from them*, would seem to be, the difference, measured in money, between the amount of produce under the two systems : and it is on these principles that the letter addressed by Lord Bathurst to the Governor of Demerara in February 1826*, appears to have been framed.

* Vide Appendix E.

If it were possible to suppose that any man could hesitate to entertain the sincere wish, that these propositions of the superior value of free labour over slave labour were strictly and inviolably true and correct, he would not deserve to hold his place among his fellow-men; but why is a man to be stigmatised as a monster who argues thus? It may be perfectly true, in Great Britain and parts of Europe, that the necessities of the poor, arising from the comparative high price of food—from the necessity of warm and comparatively expensive clothing, and comparatively expensive lodging—and from all those incidents that arise out of a dense state of population, and where the climate is sufficiently cold to render bodily exertion practicable without any thing approaching to pain, may be such that their labour may be always calculated upon as a certain result, under the influence of those irremovable necessities. Consequently, it may be true that the desire of bettering their condition may also operate in a country or countries under such given circumstances; but the question is, will this analogy apply to a country where the price of food necessary to sustain life is scarcely a calculable price, inasmuch as nature almost spontaneously brings it forth,—where clothing is all but unnecessary,—where lodging is equally so,—where the climate makes labour comparatively a pain, and cessation from labour comparatively a pleasure,—and where a

thin instead of a dense population prevents that encroachment of population on subsistence, which, under all the preceding conditions, would, if it did exist, compel a free man, not having property, to active and even laborious and uniform exertion?—The abolitionists maintain that none of these conditions will prevent a slave, when free, from executing the duties of sugar-husbandry, provided that he receives what may be called fair and adequate wages. It must be repeated, who does not wish that he may be right? but who would venture to legislate conclusively with reference to his opinions, with the chance of his being wrong? It may be stated, and stated with perfect truth, that, as far as experience goes, he is wrong; but it is unnecessary and superfluous to the argument to say that, because experience does not confirm his opinions, they are therefore necessarily inaccurate. He may say, religious education is a necessary element to induce negroes to work under the conditions above recited; and, although experience may show that, as yet, no negroes have been found to work voluntarily in countries under those conditions, it is no proof that they may not be disposed to do so for the future. It must be repeated, therefore, that it is idle in argument to lay down an absolute principle, when it is utterly unnecessary for the maintenance of the proposition which is sought to be established. It is sufficient to maintain that,

hitherto, no satisfactory instance can be adduced, of negroes working continuously and laboriously for hire in sugar-cultivation, under the conditions above recited; and that therefore it requires strong arguments to support the probability of their doing so at any future period: and it must be observed that, until the abolitionists fairly bring before parliament and the public authenticated instances in justification of their opinion, it is too much to expect that mere moral speculation is to be accepted as a substitute for fact and analogical reasoning.

How, then, does this train of argument bear on the compulsory manumission clauses,* and what do those clauses enact?—That if a slave shall be desirous to purchase the freedom of himself, or of his or her wife, husband, child, brother, sister, or reputed wife, &c., and if the owner be unwilling to effect the manumission, or if (from circumstances specified in the order in council) it be impracticable, the parties shall be summoned before the chief judge of the island, who is to require the protector of slaves on the one side, and the owner of the slave on the other, to appoint each an appraiser, and the chief judge is himself to nominate an umpire. The appraisers (and in case of their disagreement, the umpire) are, upon oath, to appraise the value of the slave; and upon payment of the amount to the

* Vide Appendix D.

treasurer of the island, for the benefit of the owner, the slave is to be free.

Common sense points out that, if the master receive a slave of equivalent qualities, and consequently of equivalent value, in the stead of the slave who avails himself of this enactment by obtaining his manumission, he suffers no calculable or appreciable injury. He may say, 'there is something in that slave which I prefer to any other slave, and therefore I cannot be satisfied with a slave of equivalent quality ;' but such an assumption of value could not be the subject of appraisement ; and if the appraisers on their oaths were to furnish him with a slave of equivalent quality and value, he would have no ground of complaint.

Secondly, if the proprietor does not actually receive a slave of equivalent value, but receives a money-price which is, at any moment, *bonâ fide*, capable of producing to him a slave of equivalent quality or value, and if he prefers to receive the money rather than the slave, he cannot be said to suffer any injury.

Thirdly, if he can acquire and command permanently the services of a free labourer or labourers, who will execute for wages the work previously performed by the slave,—and if the wages which he pays to that labourer or those labourers are no more than the expense which he incurred for the maintenance of his slave from infancy to age, he

will not have a pretext for requiring one single farthing of compensation.

Fourthly, however, supposing that he would be compelled to pay those free labourers more wages than amounted to the money-value of what he expended in the maintenance of his slave, if he derived from any source a sufficient sum to pay that extra amount, having received that money-value, he would not have a pretext for further compensation.

Fifthly, if he cannot command the services of a substituted slave or of a free labourer; and if, consequently, a certain portion of his fixed capital is to remain unemployed, he cannot be treated with equity (according to the views of the resolution, 'the equitable consideration of the interests of private property') if his slave be taken away, without paying him an equitable compensation for the injury which he sustains by the loss of that slave.—These five conditions include all the possible results which may arise out of the practical execution of the 'compulsory manumission clause.'

The manner in which a sugar-estate might be injured by the subtraction from it of certain slaves, whose services could not be replaced by the labour of other slaves, or by free labour, although pecuniary compensation might be given for those slaves upon the principle of appraisement, might be illustrated in the following manner:—Supposing an overshot wheel to have twenty buckets, which fill

at each revolution of the wheel, and that the force of the water contained in those twenty buckets is sufficient to turn the wheel with an adequate degree of rapidity ; and supposing, also, that the average emoluments arising to the owner of the wheel were to be taken at ten shillings per hour—in other words, that a certain quantity of corn could be ground during that period, the wheel going at a certain rate, producing a revenue of ten shillings per hour ;—if four of those buckets were compulsorily to be removed from the wheel, and if four similar buckets were to be substituted, it is perfectly clear that the proprietor would suffer no loss. Secondly, if at the time when the four buckets were taken away, any other principle were to be substituted, giving to the wheel the force of twenty buckets, he would equally sustain no loss. Thirdly, if he received two shillings per hour for the loss of the buckets, and the wheel still continued to produce him eight shillings per hour—he would in this case also sustain no loss. But, fourthly, if the effect of the withdrawal of these buckets were to diminish the rapidity of the wheel, not in the proportion of one-fifth, but in a greater proportion, it is perfectly evident that the compensation of two shillings per hour would not place him in the same position as before their removal. For example: if, after the removal of those four buckets, the wheel would only produce him a revenue of six shillings

per hour, he would sustain a loss of two shillings per hour. Consequently, if he were to receive an equitable compensation for the loss of the four buckets, he would receive four shillings, instead of two shillings—in other words, two-fifths, instead of one-fifth, of the income produced by the wheel. This principle would apply in equity; whatever might be the extent of the diminution of his buckets, it would only be for him to demonstrate that the rapidity of the wheel had been so diminished, and could not be increased otherwise than by an increase of the number of buckets, and his case would be complete. Now this analogy strictly and conclusively applies to the case of a proprietor of a sugar-estate, from whose estate slaves are compulsorily removed. Supposing that, for the sake of argument, it be admitted that their place cannot be supplied by other slaves or by free labour; in that case it is evident that the equitable compensation to which the planter would be entitled—in other words, the price of his slaves—would be governed by the difference of the ratio between the amount of his whole produce prior to the slaves being removed, and of his produce subsequent to their removal. If the ratio between the produce of those two periods were the same as between the number of his slaves prior and subsequent to the manumission, in that case he would only be entitled to look to a compensation founded on the fractional part of the value of the whole estate which each slave

might be considered as forming; precisely as, in the analogy of the mill, if the sixteen buckets produced eight shillings, after the four had been withdrawn, the miller would only be entitled to the compensation of one-fifth; but if, on the other hand, experience had shown that an estate would produce two-fifths less, after one-fifth of the number of slaves had been removed, in that case the equitable compensation to the planter would be at the rate of two-fifths of the value of the estate, instead of merely one. Such is the principle which would palpably regulate equitable compensation, according to the principles laid down in Lord Bathurst's despatch to Demerara; and if so regulated, the peculiar injury which has been pointed out in the speech* of Mr. Van Berkel, in the Court of Policy of Demerara, as likely to be sustained by the mortgagee, will be effectually avoided. If it should be remarked, with reference to this calculation, that compensation may become very expensive, unless free labour be found to answer, the reply must be—Can it be shown that the pledge of the resolutions of the House of Commons, involving the 'equitable consideration of the interests of private property,' can be satisfied, unless compensation on this principle be strictly and accurately applied? The period when any such principle could come into operation must necessarily be at a distance; but still it is not less cer-

* Printed in Demerara.

tain that it must and would come into operation, unless the opinions of the abolitionists be confirmed by future experience—namely, that if the negro be only educated, well treated, and his condition practically meliorated, he will not turn out, when free, to be an indolent, inefficient being, but will be disposed, under the principle of bettering his condition, to execute the duties necessary to sugar-cultivation, for a reasonable rate of wages. However difficult the practical working of such a system might be, it is not easy to understand in what manner prejudice is to accrue to individual proprietors in the West Indies, if this principle be inviolably followed; but it is to be recollected that, in the principle of this compensation, not only the interests of the planter, but the interests of the state, are involved; for, to revert to the illustration of the mill, let it be supposed that, out of the ten shillings which the miller gains per hour, five shillings are paid as a tax in a contribution to the state,—it will be seen that the equitable compensation to the miller would only amount to two shillings, but then the revenue will lose the other two shillings, unless a compensation were made to the revenue, as well as to the individual—a possibility which would be clearly out of the question.

The substance of this reasoning may be summed up as being simply this: that, if the abolitionists are proved to be in the right in their opinion, a

measure unimpeachable for its humanity will have been carried into effect without national loss. If, on the other hand, their opinion shall prove to be in the wrong, the compulsory manumission clauses must become, at no distant period, a dead letter, unless the state interpose to contribute the difference between the price which an industrious slave may, by his industry, obtain for his manumission, and that price which the planter is entitled to receive, on the principle of equitable compensation, for the loss of his property.

The order in council, containing the compulsory manumission clauses, has remained on the table of the House of Commons for two years and a half, without any motion having been made upon it, or any abuse levelled against it, by any individual of the last parliament, connected with the West Indian interest, except in a speech of the present Lord Seaford (Mr. C. R. Ellis), made on the day on which Mr. Canning uttered his celebrated commentary on its enactments. In that speech Mr. Ellis contended that the government ought not to have—"departed
 " from the principles formerly laid down by the
 " abolitionists themselves, and expressed by their
 " own organ, in a Report published by the African
 " Institution, in which, while they repel with indig-
 " nation all imputation of having in contempla-
 " tion any other more abrupt means, they declare
 " that they look only to the extinction of slavery

“ ‘ by the same happy means which had put an end
 “ to it in England’—‘ by the encouragement (not
 “ compulsion) of particular manumissions’—‘ to an
 “ emancipation of which, not the slaves, but the
 “ masters, should be the willing instruments.’ ”

Undoubtedly, Lord Seaford was perfectly justified in adverting to the principles laid down by the abolitionists, and expressed by their own organ, to which he referred ; but he could not fail to recollect, at the same moment, that, although he had a perfect and entire right to enter his protest against the individual enactment, yet he was a party to those very resolutions under which that enactment was made imperatively necessary ; and that the true mode of meeting the difficulty would have been to move for the rescindment of that part of the resolutions which went to the extent of pledging the House and the Government to measures which were to prepare the slave for a participation in the rights and privileges of Englishmen.

It is sometimes argued, that there was no necessity whatever for introducing the manumission clauses into the Trinidad order, as a more natural and safe mode of putting an end to slavery would have been through the medium of voluntary manumissions. But those persons who maintain this argument forget, by their own showing, that it is an untenable one. They contend, that it is dangerous to manumit compulsorily, as the slave, when manu-

mitted, will not be content to work for reasonable hire, and consequently the production of sugar cannot be carried on, and the fixed capital of the proprietor will be deteriorated, if not destroyed. If it be unimpeachably true, that such will be the case in the event of compulsory manumissions, where a certificate of industry is necessary to qualify the slave for receiving the boon,—*à fortiori* it must take place in the case of voluntary manumissions; for caprice or favouritism may induce the voluntary manumission of an idle slave. Consequently, the inference is irresistible, that voluntary manumissions would soon cease altogether, (except in such special cases,) if the loss of the slave could not be replaced by free labour to the master. The argument, therefore, that the purposes of the Resolutions of the House of Commons could have been fulfilled under a system of voluntary manumission, falls to the ground (as has already been contended) by the very showing of the parties who advance it. Whether it were right or wrong, just or expedient, for the resolutions to pledge Parliament and the Government to the extent of progressively elevating the slave to the rights and privileges of an Englishman, is another question, quite apart. It is only necessary to show that the Executive Government could not escape from the course imposed on them by the resolutions, under a system of mere voluntary manumission. Nor is this all: for an accurate

examination of the voluntary manumissions which have taken place in the West Indies during a series of years, will show that they have almost *exclusively* occurred in the cases of domestic slaves and tradesmen; whereas the sympathies of the country, which led to the resolutions of the House of Commons, were excited by the presumed condition of the field-slaves. What possible effect, therefore, could voluntary manumissions have produced upon the numerous class of field-slaves, in furthering the expressed purpose of those resolutions, to which the House of Commons, be it remembered, were unanimously consentient?

But if all the dangers which the writer of the "Address" professes to perceive in these four manumission clauses really exist, how happens it that not one single member of the West Indian body ever drew the attention of Parliament to these anticipated evils? That they did not do so is unquestionable; and what is the inference, but that they considered the course which the government had taken, as a safe and judicious course; and that they did not share, and do not share, and never can share, the abusive opinions which the writer of this pamphlet has thought fit to address to the members of the present House of Commons?

The writer of "the Address" proceeds to state, that "the Trinidad order in council was framed accordingly, but when the Court of Policy in De-

“merara were requested to originate a similar law,
 “they at once said it was beyond their power; that
 “they had not a right to invade the property of
 “their fellow colonists, by admitting that they could
 “be in any manner deprived of it contrary to the
 “law by which it was secured to them, and which
 “his Majesty had been graciously pleased to
 “guarantee by the articles of capitulation on which
 “the colony had surrendered to his Majesty’s arms;
 “that the difference between the Spanish law in
 “Trinidad and the Dutch law in Demerara was
 “great; that the Trinidad order in council had not
 “affected the principle of the Spanish law, which
 “allowed a slave to enfranchise himself by pur-
 “chase, whereas the Dutch law gave no such right;
 “the interest of an owner in his slave being that
 “of fee-simple absolute, whilst the purchaser of a
 “slave in Trinidad knew beforehand that he could
 “only acquire a precarious title, depending on the
 “ability of the slave to purchase; but that, in short,
 “let the Spanish law be what it might, it could
 “never alter the right of property in Demerara.”

May it be inquired what is the case in England,
 when the property of individuals is deemed neces-
 sary to be sacrificed for some public purpose? Does
 not it follow that equitable compensation is given?
 Does the writer pretend to say that the Demerara
 planter was ever asked to consent to the manumis-
 sion of his slave on any other terms than those of

receiving an equitable compensation? What perfect trash, then, is it to talk of not being able to make such laws! If this writer had said, the principle of the government is perfectly correct in giving equitable compensation, but it can be shown that the manner in which they mean to give that compensation is objectionable, and, consequently, not equitable, that would have been an argument which any person could understand, and which should be weighed and considered with reference to its merits; and if any defect could be pointed out in the instructions given by the Secretary of State, or in the order in council, by remedying which the resolutions of parliament, which enacted that the equitable interests of private property should be preserved, could be more fully accomplished, the argument would be unobjectionable. But this gentleman deliberately imputes to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, that he, knowingly and hostilely, attempted to force a law on the Demerara planters, in which the principle of equitable compensation was not involved. To show the extravagant unreasonableness with which he pursues this part of the subject, and the contemptible opinion which he must have formed of the judgment and sense of the members of the House of Commons, whom he addresses, he states, that Lord Bathurst has recommended such legislation that the ingenuity of the slave will be exerted to diminish his own value, as

well as that of his master's estate. Now, Lord Bathurst, in his despatch of February, 1826, which only contains recommendations to the Court of Policy to frame themselves a manumission law, suggests, that where money is procured by the honest earnings of the slave, it is to be presumed that he has been industrious ; but that where there was no test of previous habits of industry, a certificate of good conduct, for five years, should be required from the protector of slaves before the manumission should be completed. The writer of the Address states, then, that the slave is encouraged to idleness by the suggestions of the Secretary of State.* The Secretary of State says, no slave shall be entitled to his manumission who has not a certificate of five years' industrious conduct from the protector of slaves. It may then be inquired, is it not tampering with the House of Commons to maintain such a proposition?

The writer of the Address, gleaned from Lord Bathurst's public letter all the principles contained in the argument, avails himself of the palpable inferences from the exposition of those principles, and produces them as arguments which he has a right to use against the doctrine of the Secretary of State. He says, (as a proposition for which he claims extreme merit,)—"I allow it to be out of the reach of

* Vide Appendix E.

“human ingenuity to achieve compulsory manumission with justice to the planter and slave, except by an honest contribution on the part of the country.” In his first edition, the writer entirely omits to notice that he had borrowed that sentiment exclusively from Lord Bathurst’s despatch. In the second edition, he says, “Lord Bathurst admits that a time may come when it may be necessary for the state to make up the deficiency between what the slave may be able to earn and what the owner may lose; but this admission only confirms my opinion, that compulsory manumission ought never to have been proposed, without the accompaniment of a compensation fund.” Any person reading this note would suppose that the observations in the pamphlet had elicited this “admission” on the part of Lord Bathurst, and not that the admission (as the writer is pleased to call it) preceded that opinion which he has now so solemnly delivered to the public.

Now what are the words of Lord Bathurst’s despatch?—“If, then, as many contend, and as will probably in some places turn out to be the case, the slaves who have purchased their freedom shall voluntarily work either for their own master or some other, a system of free labour will be gradually introduced, which, although it may not

“ at first operate to reduce the price, will prevent
 “ any great increase in successive valuations.”

“ But if, in the process of time,” (and it must be
 remembered that in this despatch a five years’
 certificate of industry was required as a necessary
 qualification for the slave to manumit himself,) “ it
 “ should be unfortunately found that the slaves thus
 “ manumitted” (who might in the first instance work
 for hire) “ altogether abandon their owners, and
 “ refuse to work as free persons, the owner, not
 “ having the means, by reason of the Abolition
 “ Act, to supply the loss of his slaves, and not being
 “ able to engage any free-labourer for his sugar-
 “ plantations, the price which must then be assigned
 “ to the loss of each slave must have a direct refer-
 “ ence to that state in which the plantation will be
 “ placed by the progressive reduction of the means
 “ of cultivating it. Under such circumstances, the
 “ price assigned may soon far exceed any possible
 “ means of a slave to purchase his own freedom ;
 “ and that will be the period when, if individual
 “ benevolence be found insufficient, the state will
 “ be called upon to interfere, not by depriving the
 “ owner of any part of the estimated value of the
 “ slave, but by making up the deficiency between
 “ what the slave may be enabled to earn by habits
 “ of industry, and what the owner will be estimated
 “ to lose by being deprived of the labour of his

“ slave. This principle of manumission will pro-
 “ ceed on presumptive evidence of the slave having
 “ acquired habits of industry which may fit him for
 “ an independent existence, while it will secure to
 “ the owner that compensation to which it may be
 “ found by experience, as the measure advances in
 “ operation, he will be fairly entitled ; and it is by
 “ experience alone that this can be ascertained. A
 “ manumission of slaves under these regulations
 “ will be in conformity with the concluding reso-
 “ lution of the House of Commons in 1823, which
 “ declares, that the great object of emancipation
 “ must be accomplished at the earliest period which
 “ shall be compatible with the well-being of the
 “ slaves themselves, with the safety of the colonies,
 “ and with a fair and equitable consideration of the
 “ interests of private property.”

Does the writer of the Address mean to say,
 that parliament ought to have been called upon to
 vote a fund to have remained in a state of abey-
 ance, without any occasion for its immediate ap-
 plication? Is he aware that, until the manumis-
 sion clause has come into something like active
 operation, there is no conceivable reason why the
 price of slaves should be beyond that price which
 the industry of the slave himself might enable him
 to pay for the purchase of a substitute? He has
 given too much attention to the subject not to be
 perfectly aware, that these reasons are conclusive

against the establishment of a fund, prior to any claims as likely to be made upon it; and he has the recorded sentiments of the Secretary of State in print before him, that a period may arrive when the state will be called upon to produce such a fund.

Any person who reads this "Address" would suppose that the effect of the manumission clauses had only been appreciated by the writer, and that the light had suddenly broken in upon him; for he does not hesitate to help himself, without the slightest acknowledgment, to arguments that have already appeared in print for more than half a year.*

The discussion of the principles on which this reasoning depends, and the inevitable result and consequences of those principles, has, it must be admitted, been studiously and carefully avoided in parliament. As the West Indians have long been told that, in the understanding, and discussion, and explanation of these principles, the fate of their interests must be necessarily and speedily involved, it is impossible not to believe that they have been satisfied, as they ought to be, and grateful, as they

* Vide Appendix F., which contains an extract from a pamphlet, entitled, "The West India Question practically considered;" and which pamphlet was introduced into a list of pamphlets specially recommended by the West Indians for general perusal.

ought to be, for the equitable consideration which the measures of government have secured to their interests; for, if such be not their feeling, their silence in parliament must be characterized as most inconsistent and most unjustifiable, and more calculated to perplex, mislead, and deceive the government, than any circumstance that can be cited as a parallel in the history of the country. For two years and a half have they had before them the clause in the Trinidad order on the subject of compulsory manumission. For more than a year they have had the commentary of Lord Bathurst, pointing out the principles on which the manumission clause was to be carried into effect; and now, in the eleventh hour, a gentleman, on the part of the West Indian body, thinks proper to appeal to the House of Commons, as if something had been suddenly, unauthorizedly, and unnecessarily carried into effect by a principal executive department of the state, which was necessarily calculated to produce the investigation and reprehension of parliament.

This subject might be pursued much farther; but enough has been said to leave the justice and candour of the members of the new parliament to decide whether these remarks have or have not afforded a conclusive refutation of the attacks made in "*the Address*."

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APPENDIX.

to Remarks.

A.

Extracts from the Quarterly Review, No. 60.

It appears, therefore, to us, that all considerations which do not directly apply to the question of the practicability of the transmutation of slave labour into free labour by a process not endangering the property of the planter, are completely irrelevant; and that the object of all those who discuss this question should be, instead of awakening animosities and widening dissensions, to invite both parties to some common ground, where at least they may agree in principle, though they may differ in some points of practice. We would inquire, therefore, whether the resolutions of the House of Commons on the subject of colonial slavery, passed in the course of the last year, admit of an explanation, as to their spirit and their letter, which would be satisfactory to both the parties opposed on this subject—the Abolitionists and the West Indians. The former insist, that the slaves will be made more valuable to their masters as free labourers than they have been in the state of slavery: the latter are sceptical as to the result of such an experiment; and they contend, that compensation is due to them for any legislative change which affects the value or security of their property; but if such transmutation would, as is asserted, be necessarily advantageous, these objections would be removed.

We would not prejudice the case, as to what effect may be

ultimately produced by a progressive transmutation of slave labour into free labour; and we are in the fullest degree convinced of the difficulties, and of the uncertain success which may await the experiment; but we must with equal confidence assert, that if it were successfully carried into effect, the property of the planters would be benefited by it rather than injured.

In the view, then, which we take of this great question, we think that much which occupies the attention of the public, is comparatively matter of little importance, and in a practical point of view, irrelevant. It is, therefore, on the question of free and slave labour, that the Abolitionists and the West Indians should endeavour to meet. It is on this debateable ground that they may concur in the pursuit of an inquiry, which must afford much interesting information to both parties. And it clearly appears to us that without such an inquiry no real progress can be made in the final solution of the difficulties which encompass this momentous question.

The labour required for the production of sugar has these peculiar characteristics,—it is continuous and sometimes severe; it is incapable of being interrupted for any length of time, without serious prejudice to the cultivators; and at present, it is impossible to deny that one of the principal inducements to that continuous exertion is the dread of punishment. We must here again introduce the remark, that it is the nature of the African to be indolent, inasmuch as his wants are few, and those few almost spontaneously satisfied in the climate under which he lives. There is little difference of opinion among those who have examined the subject, as to that inseparable connexion of exertion with climate, which would enable any one to pronounce on the probable industry of a nation, from the mere knowledge of this physical circumstance. This proposition would necessarily be modified by density of population and particular circumstances of civilization; but still the principle is true, and not to be dismissed from our view in the consideration of this difficult problem. The practical question then is—what stimulus

do we expect, by our progressive improvements, to substitute for this fear of punishment, so as to induce the free negro to perform the task of sugar cultivation with that energy and continuity which can alone render his labour beneficial to the planter? It is necessary to substitute some equivalent *moral* stimulus. The first, and, unquestionably, the only safe basis on which we can proceed, is moral and religious instruction. On this must be superinduced the artificial wants of civilized life—the fair desire of the acquisition of property; which object of desire, when once created, can only be obtained through the medium of continued industry. Can any principle be suggested, under the operation of which free labour can be substituted for slave labour, that is not brought about by such a process? If the answer be in the negative, the question then is, how are we to regulate the intermediate stage between the present state of things and the accomplishment of the object, without injury to the property of the slave proprietor? And if injury of a pecuniary sort be inseparable from this transmutation, in what degree, and in what manner, and when, is compensation to be given? It appears to us, that it is by such an inquiry alone, fairly and temperately pursued, that the subject can be brought fully into view; and it will, moreover, have this peculiar advantage, that parliamentary discussions might be postponed until adequate information had been procured, while the attention of the contending parties, being called to one common principle, would be diverted from those retrospective considerations of wrongs and injuries on both sides, which have produced, and must and will produce, the most inconvenient and dangerous results both at home and abroad.

We have already stated, that no precedent exists of free negroes having performed the duties necessarily required in the cultivation and manufacture of sugar, in such a manner as to afford a profit to their employers. We are not, however, in any degree disposed to infer, from this fact, the impossibility of free labour being ever substituted for slave labour with advantage to

the proprietors ; we only mean to show that such a contingency has not yet taken place in the production of sugar in the West Indies, and that it can only take place under a combination of circumstances which has never yet occurred ; and if we do not succeed in bringing about this substitution, it is absolutely impossible to escape from the alternative of either affording to our West India Colonies a pecuniary compensation from the national funds, or of effecting the ruin of the proprietors, who will be unable to carry on the cultivation in which they have vested their capital under public sanction, and in consequence of public encouragement. If it can be shown that our opinions are erroneous, we shall most willingly abandon them ; but we shall never yield to declamation, or to arguments that are not directly founded upon facts of a clear and unimpeachable nature ; and, in a question of such extreme delicacy, we must beg leave to observe, that those who advance facts, of the correctness of which they are not absolutely certain, allow themselves a latitude very nearly approaching to criminality.

Sierra Leone is often cited as a proof of the advantage of free over slave labour. We consider that a practical experiment has been carried on in that colony with respect to the capacity of the African ; it is there that we shall have an opportunity of ascertaining to what degree he is capable of intellectual improvement and moral conduct, and of adaptation to the duties of civilized society. That such an experiment was highly desirable we admit ; we are therefore prepared to approve the considerable expenditure of the national capital which has been liberally afforded by parliament for the purposes of its trial—we consider that experiment comparatively in its infancy—but we absolutely deny that, as far as it has gone, it in the slightest degree affects the question of the transmutation of slave labour into free labour, *under circumstances wherein the pecuniary interests of the proprietor are equitably regarded.* The question is not whether the African slave, repossessed of freedom in the colony of Sierra Leone, may not, after having been maintained at the

expense of the government for some years, be placed in a situation where he can procure a subsistence for himself,—the implements and the capital necessary for the preparation of the land being provided for him, and the resources of the parent state afforded to give every advantage to the disposal of commodities produced by him,—but whether the slave made free in the West Indies will consent to the exertion of labour on a sugar estate, for the sake of receiving an adequate return in wages, whereby the proprietor will be enabled to continue its cultivation with advantage.

After all, the labour in Sierra Leone is not the cultivation of sugar, and therefore the analogy fails at once ; for it is the cultivation of sugar that is the main practical question with respect to the West India proprietor.

B.

Extracts from the Preface to "Considerations submitted in defence of the Orders in Council for the Melioration of Slavery in Trinidad; and upon the probable effect of sudden Emancipation on Agricultural Industry, and British Capital in the West Indies, in a Series of Letters which appeared in the Star Newspaper under the Signature of Vindex.—To which is annexed the Thirteenth Article in the Sixtieth Number of the Quarterly Review; and the Observations thereon in a Series of Letters, which appeared in the New Times Newspaper, under the Signature of Anglus."

Its simple purpose is to point out, and to refute, the erroneous reasoning which is to be found in the pages of Anglus; and to arrest, and, if possible, force the public attention to a consideration of the difficulties, be they more or less, which attend the accomplishment of any measures, which have for their object the termination of one state of society, and the introduction of another. The argument is contained within very narrow limits.

Slavery, as a state, was adopted in the West Indies, principally for the cultivation of the sugar-cane, by the means of manual labour,—no class of free labourers being found in the West Indies, either competent to effect that purpose, or willing to effect it, if competent;—and the European race of men being physically incapable of carrying on the practical parts of agricultural labour, in the lower and more fertile soils of the Torrid Zone. Under such circumstances it was the policy of that period of our history, to consider the prosperity and welfare of our country, and countrymen, as the most important objects to be obtained, without considering how these objects might injure the

inhabitants of other parts of the world; and as the inhabitants of Africa were found capable of encountering this toil in the West Indies, they were seized upon as slaves, and removed, without remorse, from their own country.

The protection and encouragement of the West India Sugar Colonies, thus dependent on the labour of slaves for their cultivation, have been a general and palpable object of British legislation for more than a century.

But if it be the general and palpable object of the British nation, at the present period, to supersede the state of slavery which has been both directly and indirectly fostered and encouraged by themselves, and consequently to deprive the Sugar Planter of the particular character of labour by which, hitherto, he has effected its cultivation; it is consonant to justice, to adopt one of these two alternatives,—either to take care that the termination of this state of slavery, and the introduction of another, be so gradual, and accompanied with such collateral circumstances, as to insure to the planter adequate personal protection and a continued supply of labour, at such a rate of wages as is compatible with his necessary and average profits;—or to compensate him for the pecuniary loss, which this change of national purpose, this tardy sacrifice to humanity, if hastily carried into effect, must necessarily impose upon him.

It is not probable that the people of England will be disposed to furnish that degree of pecuniary compensation, which would be a fair equivalent to the planter, for the general and immediate abstraction of the services of the slave, which must be the result of *hasty measures* of emancipation.

And if the slave were suddenly emancipated, in his present uninformed, and comparatively degraded state, it is not probable that humanity and civilization would gain by the change, under the present circumstances of property and of persons in the West Indies, where the climate, and the proportion between the number of the working population, and the capital vested in agriculture, is so very different from that of England.

If immediate emancipation be inexpedient, therefore, with reference to the combined interests of the public, of the master, and of the slave, what are the nature and character of the measures by which such emancipation can be safely induced at any future period?

The answer would appear to be, in the first place, by laying a foundation for improving the moral character of the slave by religious instruction,—on this basis, to adopt measures to inspire him with a desire to better his condition, and that of his family, by his own exertions, without neglecting the fair interests of his master. When these measures shall have been accomplished, (and for their completion time is indispensably necessary,) we may hope to see a change, (which, it must be confessed, we have not yet seen in the West Indies,) under which the negro, for *adequate* wages, will voluntarily encounter that degree of exertion necessary to cultivate those tropical productions of the Torrid Zone, which have exchangeable value in England, for the mutual benefit of himself, a free labourer, and of his former master, now merely the owner of certain lands, buildings, and machinery. And, with reference to this part of the subject, it may be observed, that if such a change can be temperately effected, there can be no doubt of its destroying for ever any attachment, which, from a sense of personal interest, may be now felt to the maintenance of the slave system, by the West India Proprietors.

How far these effects can be practically produced, under all the difficulties of the case, is a question which time only can solve.

In this early stage of the experiment, it is sufficient to establish, that the preliminary measures which have been adopted by the government, are more adapted than any others that have been suggested for the accomplishment of this object. Anglus and his partisans maintain, that if the slaves be immediately emancipated, this free labour will be *immediately* at the service of the planter. The Quarterly Review and Vindex maintain,

on the contrary, that however desirable it may be that this statement were true, it is notoriously and flagrantly incorrect, calculated to mislead the public, to induce erroneous conceptions on a point of the most vital importance, to mortify the expectations of the British people, and to involve the West India planters in ruin. This point forms the main object of the controversy in these letters. It will be for the public to examine the arguments on either side, and to adopt those conclusions which appear to be supported by arguments founded on facts.

In short, the object of this publication is to enforce the spirit of that precautionary adage, which, according to an Eastern story, saved the life of a Cham of Tartary:—"Begin nothing of which thou hast not well considered the end."

C.

1. *Extract from "An Appeal to the Religion, Justice, and Humanity of the British Empire, in behalf of the Negro Slaves in the West Indies, &c. By William Wilberforce, Esq. London. 1823."*

AGAIN, the impression so assiduously attempted heretofore to be made, that the *indolence* of the Negro race was utterly incurable, and that without the driving whip they never would willingly engage in agricultural labour, has been shewn to be utterly without foundation.—p. 67.

2. *Extract from "A Letter to M. Jean Baptiste Say, on the Comparative Expense of Free and Slave Labour. By Adam Hodgson. Liverpool." Printed 1823.*

If slave labour were cheaper than free labour, we should naturally expect to find it employed in the cultivation of those articles in which extended competition had reduced profits to the lowest point. On the contrary, however, we find that slave labour is gradually exterminated when brought into competition with free labour, except where *legislative protection* or *peculiarity of soil and climate* establish such a monopoly as to admit of an expensive system of management.—p. 16.

If slave labour were cheaper than free labour, we might confidently presume that estates would be rendered less productive by the emancipation of the slaves which cultivated them; but the presumption is contradicted by experience.—p. 27.

3. *Extract from "Relief for West India Distresses, &c. &c." By James Cropper. London. 1823."*

I might enlarge much on the loss which our West Indian Colonists have sustained in various ways by pertinaciously adhering to the wretched system of cultivating their estates with "forced labourers," to perform the work for their own profit. This subject, however, has been so ably treated in a recent publication by Adam Hodgson, entitled, "A Letter to M. Jean Baptiste Say, on the Comparative Expense of Free and Slave Labour," that I shall only notice one curious fact connected with it, &c. &c.—p. 17.

4. *Extract from "Thoughts on the Necessity of Improving the Condition of the Slaves in the British Colonies, &c. By T. Clarkson, Esq. London. 1823."*

Having now established, I hope, two of my points; first, that emancipation is practicable; and, secondly, that it is practicable without danger, I proceed to shew the probability that it would be attended with profit to those planters who should be permitted to adopt it. I return, therefore, to the case of Mr. Steele, &c. &c.—p. 42.

5. *Extract from "First Report of the Committee of the Society for the Mitigation and Gradual Abolition of Slavery, &c. London. 1824."*

Another argument, which has been most strongly insisted upon by West Indians and their advocates, has been, that little in the way of industry is to be expected from the voluntary exertions of emancipated slaves. It would of course be impossible to discuss at large, on this occasion, the comparative advantages of free and slave labour, but this is in fact rendered unnecessary by many of the publications of the Society which are already in

the hands of the subscribers. If any point in political science is more clearly distinguished than another, it is, that free labour is more advantageous than slave labour; and this very point may, as your Committee conceive, be irrefragably established by the very example which has chiefly been relied upon as proving the contrary, namely, the case of St. Domingo*.—p. 23.

* How far this doctrine can be maintained is shewn in the following extract from the "The West India Question practically considered," p. 51.

"One of the most popular and plausible arguments which are employed against the West India interest, has been prudently omitted, or at least very partially adverted to by Mr. Stephen. The argument thus passed over, is that which is drawn from the present state of Hayti, as a conclusive proof of the advantage, rather than the detriment, which would accrue to the West Indies from the emancipation of the Slaves. It is prominently put forward, in the Second Report of the Anti-Slavery Society, published in 1824, and is probably the most inconsequent argument that can be found in any paper gravely submitted for the information of the public. This Report alludes to the observation frequently made by the West Indians, that the Negroes, when they become free, will not work; and that the exports from the West Indies will therefore greatly diminish;—a proposition frequently put forward in West Indian publications, and supported by arguments, if not of a convincing, of a very forcible nature. The Report then puts into the mouths of the West Indians an assertion which they have never coupled with that proposition; viz., that all industry and exertion, on the part of the Slaves made free, will be at an end, and that they will merge again into the state of savages. At least, if such a proposition ever has been maintained, it is so gratuitously absurd, that it was not worth while to advert to it as a substantive argument on the part of the West Indian body. In Hayti, all industry and exertion in the production of sugar, formerly the main export of that Island, is at an end, at least for all purposes of profitable exportation; and yet the Slaves, so far from merging into the state of savages, carry on various processes of production with pecuniary advantage. If productive industry, whether casual or continuous, were to be considered as the sole test of civilization—in that case it might be contended, that civilization had retrograded in Hayti within the last thirty years; but such an opinion ought not to be admitted without very careful qualification. A reference to the tabular statement in the Appendix will show that, in the space of one year (1789), the French part of St. Domingo shipped to France

6. *Extract from Mr. W. Whitmore's Speech, 13th May, 1824.*

He had already stated, that the principal distress arose from the principle of slave labour. That slave labour was always of

alone as much sugar as amounted in value to half the price which President Boyer is to pay to France for the fee-simple of the whole Island.

"It may be assumed, that the coerced and qualified freedom in Hayti (for the freedom there is but qualified and coerced) is a more happy state for the labouring free Black, than Slavery is for the Slave in Jamaica. Nor can it be denied that the capital of the former race of proprietors in that country, having been usurped by the Black race, may be beneficially employed in their hands; that is to say, the wealth created may be greater than the wealth consumed in its production, although the capital is not employed in the cultivation of sugar, without which cultivation those former Proprietors would have been ruined, unless they had received compensation for its abandonment. Hayti may now be rich and powerful—she may become still more rich, and more powerful, under the operation of the new system of things, and independently of the exportation of sugar. But does this admission in any degree embarrass the maintenance of the proposition, that in our own West Indian Colonies, the transfer of capital from sugar production to any other class of production, cannot be effected without such serious injury as requires compensation? With this axiom in view, it is not to be expected that the West Indian Planters will accept the example of Hayti as an encouragement to press forward a state of things, which, as far as the analogy of Hayti can be taken, will lead to a discontinuance of the production of sugar. At least, they could not be expected voluntarily to press on this course, if compensation were not secured to them,—until it could be shown, on the one hand, that the production of production which has succeeded the production of sugar in Hayti could prove so beneficial to them, as to prevent all the inconveniencies of change; or, on the other hand, that their Slaves, when made free, would be more willing to submit to the exertion of sugar cultivation, than the freed Slaves of Hayti have been found to be. The Colonial Proprietor of sugar, as a British subject, has an inherent right of employing his capital in the most productive manner. Can he with justice be compelled to employ his capital less profitably, without being compensated for the transfer? If this principle, then, be applied to the state of Hayti, we shall find that all those arguments which bring forward the present state of that country as an imitable model, and as a reason to justify *abolition without compensa-*

necessity more costly than free, was not stated now for the first time: it had been invariably recognised as true by all

tion, are more specious than real, and cannot be applied, with logical effect, in any closely-reasoned argument on the state of West Indian Slavery.

"Keeping this principle in view, the reader will be more prepared to appreciate the weakness of the argument contained in the following passage from the Second Report of the Anti-Slavery Society: "But to console us
 "Under this alarm, let us look again to Hayti. There the Slaves were to
 "the full as depressed as our Slaves now are, and much more ignorant.
 "They have been engaged also in a struggle for liberty, through a long-
 "protracted period of blood and desolation, of confusion and anarchy.
 "Twenty years of sanguinary conflict, of the most barbarizing description,
 "sometimes with foreign, sometimes with domestic enemies, were little
 "calculated to train them to habits of industry, or to the arts of peace.
 "And yet what do we witness in their case? They have contrived, in the
 "period which has since elapsed, at least to maintain themselves without
 "foreign aid. Though it was necessary, and still unhappily is necessary,
 "to keep a large portion of the ablest and most active labourers under
 "arms (who are of course sustained by the labour of the rest,) their own
 "exertions have alone ministered to their subsistence, as well as defrayed
 "the entire expenditure of the state. They have not only abundantly sup-
 "plied their wants by their own labour, but they have nearly, if not more
 "than, doubled their numbers in twenty years. And while they have done
 "this, they have been advancing in intelligence, respectability, and wealth.
 "Schools have been multiplied among them, knowledge has been widely
 "diffused, the arts of civilized life have been cultivated, the reign of
 "order and law has been established, security has been given to property,
 "and industry, having its reward, has been progressively increasing its
 "boundaries. *But, in reply to this, we are gravely told, that the Haytians*
"export no sugar. This is the dark spot in their condition, for which
"nothing can compensate in the eye of a colonial partisan. They may
 "live in comfort, they may be well fed and well clothed, they may multi-
 "ply their population, they may be free, united, powerful, and happy, but
 "all this affords no satisfaction, since they do not cultivate sugar, and
 "cultivate it in gangs, under the whip, as in the English islands. And
 "yet, that they labour sufficiently to supply all their reasonable wants is
 "evident from this, that the value of foreign merchandise imported into
 "Hayti, in the year 1822, and consumed there (the whole of which must

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COMPARATIVE STATEMENTS of PRODUCE exported


NATURE OF THE GOODS AND PRODUCE EXPORTED.	Quantity of the Articles exported from the French Part of St. Domingo to France in the Year 1789, accord- ing to the Official Accounts of <i>M. Proisy.</i>	Quantity of the Articles exported from the French Part of St. Domingo to all Parts of the World in the Year 1800 according to the Official Accounts of <i>M. Bizouard.</i>	Quantity of the Articles exported from both the French and Spanish Parts of St. Domingo now called Hayti, to all Parts of the World, in the Year 1822, according to the Official Accounts of <i>M. Inginac.</i>	
MUSCOVADO SUGAR, lbs. French.	93,573,800	16,705,000	652,541	At
CLAYED SUGAR „	47,516,500			At
TOPS of Hogshead SUGAR, } or 1st qual. MUSCOVADO } „		28,900		At
COFFEE „	76,835,200	27,747,100	35,117,834	At
INDIGO „	758,600	1,900		At
COCOA „	150,000	94,500	322,145	At
COTTON „	7,004,200	2,341,900	891,950	At
SYRUP barrels	25,749			At
RUM hogsheads	598			At
HIDES (tanned entire) . . each	9,080			At
HIDES (in hair) each	11,446			At
LIGNUM VITÆ and } MAHOGANY } supposed lbs.	20,000		20,100	Co
LOGWOOD lbs,			3,816,583	Co
BLACK AND COLOURED POPULATION.	{ In the French Part of St. Do- mingo, in 1789, according to M. de Marbois, Intendant of the Colony 467,850. }		{ In all Hayti, in 1822, according to M. Inginac, 935,335. }	

The first column shews the nature and quantity of the productions exported from the French Part of St. Domingo. The second column shews the productions exported from the same part of the island to all Parts of the World. The third column shews the productions exported from the whole island to all Parts of the World. The fourth column shews the value of the articles exported in these different periods.

PRODUCE exported from ST. DOMINGO, in 1789, 1800, and 1822.

Quantity of the Articles exported from both the French and Spanish Parts of St. Domingo now called Hayti, to all Parts of the World, in the Year 1822, according to the Official Accounts of M. Inginac.	Common Rate of Valuation at the Prices of 1789.		Value of the Articles exported in 1789 to France alone.	Value of the Articles exported in 1800 to all Parts of the World.	Value of the Articles exported in 1822 to all Parts of the World.	
			Livres.	Livres.	Livres.	
652,541	At	45 Livres per quintal . . .	42,107,985	7,553,250	293,643	
. . . .	At	75 Livres ,, . . .	35,637,375			
. . . .	At	55 Livres ,, . . .		15,895		
35,117,834	At	110 Livres ,, . . .	84,518,720	30,518,510	38,629,717	
. . . .	At	1,000 Livres ,, . . .	7,586,000	19,000		
322,145	At	80 Livres ,, . . .	120,000	75,600	257,716	
891,950	At	170 Livres ,, . . .	11,907,140	3,981,230	1,516,315	
. . . .	At	110 Livres per barrel . . .	2,832,390			
. . . .	At	132 Livres per hogshead . . .	78,936			
. . . .	At	13 Livres each 	118,040			
. . . .	At	6 Livres each 	68,676			
20,100	Computed at		90,000		90,450	
3,816,583	Computed from the data of Bryan } Edwards; Vol. III. p. 215 }				101,775	
In all Hayti, in 1822, according to M. Inginac, 935,335.			TOTAL VALUE . . .	185,065,262	42,163,485	40,889,516

ns exported from the *French part* of St. Domingo to *France*, in the year 1789, when labour was performed by *the same part of the island*, to *all parts of the world*, in 1800, under the military government of Toussaint *the whole island to all parts of the world*, in 1822, under the Presidency of General Boyer. The remaining periods.



who had examined the subject, unbiassed by the influence of interest.

Undoubtedly it would be most absurd to suppose, that a free black population would continue to devote their labours to proprietors resident either in the West Indies or in England. It would be the very height of extravagance to entertain such an idea. It would be the same absurdity which is now involved in

"have been paid for by the produce of Haytian labour) amounted, by the "official returns of that island, to three millions sterling."

"With reference to this subject, it will be seen how necessary it is to distinguish between the resolutions moved by Mr. Canning, and that moved by Mr. Buxton. The example of Hayti would be a very fair example to be adduced by any person who was bound by Mr. Buxton's resolution, and by that resolution only. If Parliament stood only pledged to pursue measures with respect to the well-being of the Slaves (which was all to which Mr. Buxton's resolution pledged them), there can be no doubt that, with due management, the abandonment of sugar cultivation in the West Indies might be attended with a change which would operate the well-being of the Slaves; but how does the analogy of Hayti meet that part of the resolutions of Mr. Canning which couples the well-being of the Slaves with "*the interests of private property*?" and how can any member of Parliament, bound, and religiously bound, to abide by the spirit of the resolutions moved by Mr. Canning, to which such member personally consented, reconcile it to himself to bring forward the analogy of Hayti, as a proof that emancipation should take effect without adequate compensation? If it can be shown (which it can to demonstration,) that the change of the cultivation of an estate from sugar to any other sort of West Indian produce, having exchangeable value in Europe, requiring less labour, and soil of a different quality, is impracticable without ruin (as impracticable as it is for a Norfolk farmer to grow wheat with profit on the same land on which he did grow it with profit during certain periods of the war); it is really an appeal unworthy of the character of those who make it with apparent sincerity, to cite the state of Hayti as an imitable example of an early and unprogressive termination of slavery. All that is wanted to complete this part of the argument, and to show the little tendency that exists in Slaves, when made free, to pursue the cultivation of sugar, or even indigo (that is, of a production requiring steady continuous labour), will be furnished by a careful examination of the tabular statement appended."

maintaining that the slaves labour for their masters without the stimulus of the whip. But would the proprietors of the soil be worse off, or would the public interests suffer, if labourers in the West Indies worked, as labourers work in England, from a view not to the benefit of their employers, but of themselves? A free black population would unquestionably act upon the same principles, and with the same ends in view, as a free white population. They would be stimulated by a regard to their own interests, not to that of their employers; but under the operation of this principle, the interests of employers, as well as the general interests of the state, would, in the West Indies, as in every other portion of the globe, be more effectually served than they can possibly be by compulsory labour under the lash. We refer Mr. Baring to Mr. Cropper's and Mr. Adam Hodgson's pamphlets for proof of this proposition. It is a proposition, indeed, about which we can scarcely believe that his own enlightened mind can entertain a doubt. We may have less sugar from the West Indies, but we shall have it from some other quarter. We shall, however, have a far more extended consumption of our manufactures there, and far more of individual comfort and enjoyment.

D.

The Compulsory Manumission Clauses in the Trinidad Order in Council.

AND it is hereby further ordered, That in case any slave within the said island shall be desirous to purchase the freedom of himself, or of his or her wife, or husband, or child, or brother, or sister, or reputed wife, or husband, or child, or brother, or sister, it shall and may be lawful to and for any such slave so to purchase the freedom of himself, or of any such other person as aforesaid; and if the owner or proprietor of any such slave shall be unwilling to effect his or her manumission, or shall, by reason of any mortgage, settlement, or lease, or other charge upon or interest in such slave being vested in any other person or persons, be unable to execute a valid and effectual manumission of any such slave; or if the owner or proprietor, or any other person having an interest in any such slave, shall be a minor, or a married woman, or idiot, or lunatic, or if the real and true owner of any such slave shall be absent from the said island, or shall not be known, or if any suit or action shall be depending in any court of justice in the said island, wherein the title to the said slave, or the right to his services shall or may be in controversy, or if the owner of any such slave shall demand as the price of his or her freedom a greater sum of money than may be the fair and just value thereof, then, and in each and every of the cases aforesaid, the Chief Judge of the said island, on application to him for that purpose made by the protector and guardian of slaves, shall issue a summons under his hand and seal, requiring the owner or manager of such slave, or the persons or person under whose direction such slave may be, to appear before him, by themselves or their agents, at some convenient time and place to

be for that purpose appointed ; and notice shall also be published by the said protector and guardian of slaves, in the public Gazette of the said island, on three several days, of the time and place appointed for the purpose aforesaid ; and in such notice all persons having or claiming to have any title or interest in or to the slave proposed to be manumitted, either in their own right, or as the guardians, attornies, trustees, or executors of any other person, shall be required to attend and prefer such claims.

And it is hereby further ordered, That at the time appointed for any such meeting as aforesaid, the Chief Judge of the said island, in the presence of the protector and guardian of slaves, and also in the presence of the owner or manager of the slaves or slave proposed to be manumitted, or, (upon proof being made to him, upon oath, of the due service and publication of such notice as aforesaid, then, if necessary,) in the absence of such owner or manager, shall proceed to hear in a summary way, what may be alleged by the said protector and guardian of slaves, and by the owner or manager, or other persons claiming any interest in the slave proposed to be manumitted ; and in case the parties, or any of them, shall refuse to effect any such manumission, or if it shall appear to the said Chief Judge, that a valid and effectual manumission of any such slave cannot legally be effected by private contract, or if it shall be made to appear to the said Chief Judge, that the owner or proprietor of any such slave, or that any person having any charge upon or interest in him or her, is a minor, or a married woman, or idiot, or lunatic, or that the real and true owner of any such slave, or that any person having any charge upon, or interest in him or her, is absent from the said island, or is unknown, or cannot be found, or that any suit or action is depending in any court of justice in the said island, wherein the title to the said slave, or the right to his services is in controversy, or if it shall appear to the said Chief Judge, that any difference of opinion exists between the protector and guardian of slaves of the said island, and the owner or proprietor of any such slave, respecting his or

her price or value, then, and in every such case, the said Chief Judge shall require the protector of slaves, and the owner, manager, or person having the direction of any such slave, each to nominate an appraiser of his or her value; and the said Chief Judge shall himself nominate an umpire between such appraisers. And the said appraiser, being first duly sworn before the said judge to make a fair and impartial appraisement, shall, within seven days next after such their appointment, make a joint valuation of the slave proposed to be manumitted; and shall certify such their valuation to the Chief Judge under their hands and seals. And in case such joint certificate shall not be delivered to the said Chief Judge within the said term of seven days, then the said umpire, being duly sworn in manner aforesaid, shall, within the next seven days, certify his valuation, under his hand and seal, to the said Chief Judge; and the valuation to be made in manner aforesaid, either by the said joint appraisers, or in their default, by the said umpire, shall be binding and conclusive, and shall be entered and enrolled in the office of registry in the said island.

And it is hereby further ordered, That upon payment to the treasurer of the said island of the appraised value of any such slave as aforesaid, after deducting therefrom the expense of the appraisement to be allowed by the said Chief Judge, the said treasurer shall grant to the protector of slaves a receipt for the money so to be received by him. And such receipt shall be duly enrolled in the office of registry in the said island, together with a declaration under the hand and seal of the said Chief Judge, that the proceedings required by law for the manumission of the slave, by or on behalf of whom such money was paid, had been duly had before him, and thereupon such slave shall be, and be deemed, taken, and reputed to be, free to all intents and purposes whatsoever.

And it is further ordered, that the money to arise from the manumission of any slave by virtue of the proceedings before-mentioned, shall and may be laid out, and invested under the authority of the Chief Judge, on the application of any person or

persons interested therein in the purchase of any other slave or slaves; or if no such application shall be made, then such money shall remain in the hands of the public treasurer of the said island at interest, at and after the rate of five pounds per centum per annum, such interest to be borne by, and defrayed out of, the revenues of the said colony, and the slave or slaves so to be purchased with the said money as aforesaid; or, in case of no such purchase being made, then the said money in the hands of the said public treasurer, and the interest from time to time accruing due thereupon, shall be the property of the persons who were the proprietors of such manumitted slave or slaves, and shall be held upon, under, and subject to all such and the same uses, trusts, limitations, conditions, mortgages, claims, and demands of what nature or kind soever, as such slave or slaves was or were held upon, under or subject unto, at such the time of his, her, or their manumission; and the said treasurer shall hold the said money, and the interest accruing thereupon, subject to such order as the Chief Judge of the said colony may, upon a summary application of any person interested therein, see fit to make, and such principal money and interest shall by the said treasurer be paid, applied, and disposed of in pursuance of and obedience to any such order.

E.

*Despatch from Earl Bathurst to Sir Benjamin D'Urban ;—
printed in the Papers presented to Parliament in 1826, p. 118.*

Downing-Street, February 25, 1826.

SIR,

I HAVE received and laid before the King your despatch of the 15th of September last, with the minutes of the Court of Policy repeating the sentiments which that body continues to entertain upon three out of the four clauses which they objected to introduce into their slave law, and which were remitted for their further consideration in my despatch of the 9th July last.

With regard to the particular points which have been under the renewed consideration of the court, I am in the first place to convey to you his Majesty's gracious approval of the modified provisions respecting marriage which the court have agreed to enact, whereby the conjugal relations between slaves have obtained the support of the law, although with a proviso interdictory of the civil rights which marriage under the Dutch law confers on free men, and which are incompatible with the rights of the master over the slave.

I have, in the next place, to explain to you the views of his Majesty's Government in regard to the three subjects on which legislative provision remains to be made.

I.—With regard to Sunday labour, I have already apprized you that it is necessary to maintain the maxim that the owner of a slave has no title to his labour except during six days of the week. I have also distinctly specified, on the one hand, the offices which it is considered slaves may gratuitously perform on Sundays without violation of this principle, and on the other, those which the nature of circumstances requires to be per-

formed, but which the principle above enounced equally requires to be remunerated. "All labour undertaken for the preservation of the crops upon any estate" is an exception belonging to the latter class, and in Trinidad wages are required to be paid for such labour at the rate to be fixed by the protector of slaves.

It is under this head that the provisions of the Demerara law respecting Sunday labour, though under others much improved since I had last occasion to consider them, continue incomplete. It is yet unprovided that this conservatory labour should be allowable on Sunday only when voluntary on the part of the slaves employed, and when its postponement beyond that day would be incompatible with the preservation of the crop.

The Court of Policy have introduced into the clause certain provisions explanatory of those kinds of labour which are thereby defined to be for the preservation of the crop; namely, "First, the boiling off the cane juice that may have been expressed at the time of sun-set on Saturday, (the boiling however in no case to extend beyond the hour of ten at night,) and the potting the sugar so made." According to the representations of the Court of Policy, neither of these operations can be postponed without essential injury to the produce which has been carried through the previous processes to the stage in which these become necessary. With this understanding, the labour is allowable in both cases. In the first case, during the prescribed extra hours on Saturday night, it may perhaps be allowed that the labour should be exigible from the slave without remuneration; but in the other, in which the operation is to be performed on the Sunday morning, the principle of remuneration cannot be departed from; and it will be best maintained, not by a donation of a small portion of the produce, which is stated to be the present practice, but by the payment of ascertainable wages, to be fixed, as in other cases, by the protector of slaves. The second kind of Sunday labour which the Court of Policy defines to be for the preservation of the crop, is "the turning and drying of coffee and cotton already housed, and in a state of preser-

"vation, but not cured." This labour, too, it appears, cannot be postponed without essential injury, and may therefore be performed on Sunday. But the reasons of the Court of Policy for exacting it gratuitously are not satisfactory. The first reason is, "that the labour is of a light kind, and is performed by children, and elderly and infirm negroes, who are unfit for any kind of hard labour," and with intervals of rest, "so that a negro so employed does not, in fact, work more than five or six hours in the day." But the Court of Policy will no doubt perceive that, if the capabilities of the labourer be no more than commensurate with the labour allotted him, the hardship of the task is left where it was. The divers degrees of labour required for divers operations may properly, however, be taken into the protector's estimate of its value, when he fixes the rates of wages to be paid for it. The Court of Policy have alleged, secondly, that "the same reason which allows the employment of slaves as watchmen, or for the preservation of cattle, without receiving remuneration, doubly applies to those who are necessarily employed for the preservation of the crops." On this I have to observe, that, before the former exception was allowed, it had been strongly represented, that the protection of the slave's provision grounds, as well as the owner's property on his plantation, required the employment of watchmen, without which security of the produce from depredation the slave could not be induced to cultivate his provision grounds. It was not therefore thought fit to charge the owner with the payment of wages for services which were for the protection as well of the slave's property as of the owner's, and not more for the protection of either, than for the prevention of crime, and the maintenance of the public peace. As to tending and feeding of cattle, the degree of labour required in this kind (as in the case of domestics) would be so difficult to ascertain, and in many instances might be so slight, that it was admitted to be impracticable for the protector of slaves to assign a proportionate rate of wages applicable to the varying circumstances. But there is no such impracticability in

the case which the Court of Policy would assimilate to this, since the court itself has specified the number of hours per day, and per week, for which the slave is required to work in the turning and drying of coffee and cotton.

By these explanations, the Court of Policy will be led to perceive, that it would be impossible for me to submit to his Majesty in Council what they have alleged, as a reason for omitting to supply what is wanting in their law upon the subject of Sunday labour.

II.—The second of the legislative provisions which are still deficient in the law passed by the Court of Policy is that by which the rights of property are to be conferred upon the slaves. The court have observed that, according to the proclamation published in Trinidad explanatory of the order in council, slaves are not allowed to cultivate for their own profit the staple commodities of that island. The restriction did not originate with his Majesty's government, but they forbore to disturb the operation of a pre-existing law to this effect, in support of which was urged the temptation to commit depredations upon his owner's property, to which the slave would be exposed by its repeal. A similar law appears to be in force in Demerara. In the one colony, the slaves are forbidden to cultivate the staple commodities; in the other, to sell or barter them. Whilst it is expedient that these laws should remain—and on consideration of the reasons alleged I am not prepared to deny the expediency—I do not contend for the slave's right of property in what he cannot legally barter or sell, nor, as it is said, honestly acquire. I therefore consider the articles of sugar, coffee, and cotton, to be allowable exceptions.

The objections which are urged by the Court of Policy to the giving a slave a property in land are chiefly founded upon the disadvantages which the slave himself would labour under as a proprietor of land. But it may be presumed that a slave who shall have acquired the means of purchasing land will be prudent enough to take into his calculation the compulsory removal

to a distance which he is personally liable to; for, however otherwise ignorant, he cannot but be sufficiently sensible of what is incident to his own condition. It is also objected, that he would become liable to taxes for the repair of roads, &c. for the non-payment of which, if, as in the cases of freemen, his person were seized, an injury to his owner would ensue in the loss of his labour while in confinement. But the Court of Policy would have it in their power to obviate this objection by rendering the produce of the land, or the property upon it, or even the land itself, if necessary, liable to be taken in execution for arrears of taxes. Upon the whole, although the right of property in land may possibly be of little immediate or general advantage to the slaves, yet, under restrictions as to staple produce, I do not perceive such material objections to it as would place it in the light of a necessary exception (which is the only admissible exception) to the general rule.

I have considered with due attention the representations made by the Court of Policy in justification of not permitting the slave to have an uncontrolled power of bringing an action with regard to his property. I perceive that such a power might be much abused, by ill-disposed advisers, to the slave's own prejudice; and if the Court of Policy will give to the protector of slaves a clear undoubted right to bring or defend any action in respect to the property of the slave by whatsoever legal measures are available in other cases; and if, in addition to this, they will empower the president of the Court of Justice to direct prosecutions on the application of the slave, nothing further will be required on this head. It is not clear that the terms of the law, as it stands at present, are sufficiently general and comprehensive to bear the full and undoubted import of those employed in the order in council for Trinidad, which, were they adopted in Demerara, would enable the protector to "bring, maintain, prosecute, and defend any suit or action in any court of justice, for, or in respect of any such property, as fully and amply to all intents and purposes," as could be done by a person of free

condition, in respect of his own property. It is therefore desirable, that in this particular, some amendment should be introduced.

III.—As the right which it is proposed should be given to the slave to purchase his manumission is a vital part of the whole measure, it cannot be dispensed with. No system of measures would satisfy the feelings of this country, or would completely execute the purposes of the House of Commons, which did not contain some direct provision, some acting principle, by which the termination of slavery may be gradually accomplished; and the giving to a slave a right to purchase his freedom, by the fruits of his honest earnings, on a fair estimate of the loss which the owner may sustain by that act, guards the public, on the one hand, against the danger of indiscriminate emancipation, and secures to the planter, on the other, a pledge of an adequate compensation.

The objections which are urged against this measure are—First, That the money with which the slave may purchase his freedom may not be the earnings of his honest labour, and that, therefore, his being able to make the purchase is not a test of his industrious habits. Secondly, That the valuation may not indemnify the owner, who may not be able to supply the loss of his slave by the money which is to be paid for his manumission. With respect to the first objection, it is said—that the purchase money may be obtained either by personal favour towards the slave, or from ill-will to the owner, or by a combination of philanthropic individuals in this country; and lastly, that the slave may procure it by theft.

With respect to favour towards the slave, or ill-will to the owner, the same favour which would procure the money for the manumission of the slave, would probably secure his well-being afterwards; and if the owner received an adequate compensation, he would have little to fear from the effect either of favour to his slaves or ill-will to himself; while the general operation of the measure could not be really endangered by individual instances of kindness or malevolence.

Apprehensions are entertained lest well-disposed people, with ill-considered zeal, should endeavour at once to get rid of slavery by purchasing the manumission of slaves out of a fund to be raised for that purpose. This, undoubtedly, would be an attempt to convert a gradual and discriminative principle into an abrupt indiscriminate act of manumission; it would, however, be soon found that this would not go far, and would be easily prevented; but even under such a plan it would not be difficult to show that the pecuniary interests of the owner would be adequately protected by the proposed arbitration. For the sake of the community, indeed, such indiscriminate manumissions ought to be prevented; for undoubtedly if the purchase money were obtained from any fund which may be formed for the liberation of slaves, there would be no test of previous habits of industry, of which there is presumptive evidence where the money is procured by the honest earnings of the slave. To supply this defect it may be provided, that in such cases a certificate of good conduct for five years should be required of the protector of slaves before the manumission should be completed.

If, lastly, the slaves were, by this regulation, encouraged to defraud their owners, or others, by endeavouring to obtain dishonestly the means of purchasing their freedom, it would indeed be a serious objection to the measure, as that, which is to be considered as the test of their industry, would become the result of their depravity. But the limitations which it is agreed should be made with regard to the property which a slave may acquire, create no inconsiderable difficulties in his making those fraudulent gains; nor can it be imagined that thefts to any considerable extent can be generally practised without detection (and individual instances cannot be urged as objections to a general measure.) As an additional security, however, a provision might be introduced—that a slave duly convicted of larceny should be incapacitated from purchasing his freedom at least for a given number of years.

It remains then to consider the second objection, which in

substance is this :—That the regulations do not secure to the owner an adequate compensation. If by these regulations an adequate compensation be not secured to the owner, it must either be because the persons who are authorized to decide upon the amount are not likely to be fit or fair arbitrators, or because there are restrictions which will prevent the arbitrators from the free exercise of their judgment. Now it must be admitted nothing can be fairer than the proposed selection of arbitrators in the Trinidad order; viz., that in the event of the owner and the slave not agreeing on the price of the slave's manumission, the owner should appoint one, the protector of slaves another, and that an umpire should be appointed by the chief judge. It is clear that an arbitration on such principle would protect the interests of the owner, and if there were any objection, it would be that the bias was in his favour. As to restrictions or limitations, there are none to obstruct the free exercise of their judgments.

If indeed they were called upon to fix, once for all, one uniform price, on the payment of which all able-bodied slaves would be entitled to purchase their freedom, it might be objected, that, though at the time of such valuation the price were adequate if applicable to one slave, it would not be so, if applied, at the same time, or at some distant period, to many in the same gang; because, though the loss of one might be compensated by the price assigned, yet, if it were applied to many, the owner would suffer in an accumulated proportion. But no such uniform valuation is contemplated: on the contrary, under these regulations, each case is left to stand upon its own merits.

If, then, as many contend, and as will probably in some places turn out to be the case, the slaves, who have purchased their freedom, shall voluntarily work, either for their own master or some other, a system of free labour will be gradually introduced, which, although it may not at first operate to reduce the price, will prevent any great increase in successive valuations. But if,

in the process of time, it should be unfortunately found that the slaves thus manumitted altogether abandon their owners, and refuse to work as free persons, the owner not having the means, by reason of the Abolition Act, to supply the loss of his slaves, and not being able to engage any free labourer for his sugar plantations, the price which must then be assigned to the loss of each slave must have a direct reference to that state in which the plantation will be placed by the progressive reduction of the means of cultivating it.

Under such circumstances, the price assigned may soon far exceed any possible means of a slave to purchase his own freedom, and that will be the period when, if individual benevolence be found insufficient, the State will be called upon to interfere; not by depriving the owner of any part of the estimated value of the slave, but by making up the deficiency between what the slave may be enabled to earn by habits of industry, and what the owner will be estimated to lose by being deprived of the labour of his slave.

This principle of manumission will proceed on presumptive evidence of the slave having acquired habits of industry which may fit him for an independent existence, while it will secure to the owner that compensation to which it may be found by experience, as the measure advances in operation, he will be fairly entitled—and it is by experience alone that this can be ascertained.

A manumission of slaves under these regulations will be in conformity with the concluding resolution of the House of Commons in 1823, which declares, that the great object of emancipation must be accomplished “ at the earliest period which shall “ be compatible with the well-being of the slaves themselves, “ with the safety of the colonies, and with a fair and equitable “ consideration of the interests of private property.”

But the Court of Policy must recollect, that if, on the one hand, Parliament and His Majesty's Government stand pledged to give the planters an equitable compensation, they stand

equally pledged to take such measures as may ultimately, though gradually, work out the freedom of the slaves.

The Court of Policy may be assured, that from the final accomplishment of this object this country will not be diverted.

It remains for me only to add, that I now, for the last time, bring these regulations under the consideration of the Court, with no other alternative, in the event of their declining to admit them, than that of my humbly submitting to His Majesty the expediency of enacting them by direct Royal authority.

I have, &c.

(Signed)

BATHURST.

Major-General Sir B. D'Urban, K.C.B.,

&c. &c. &c.

F.

Extract from "The West India Question practically considered."

THE West Indians, in their claim for compensation, challenge the whole world to produce a single satisfactory precedent, where a similar ratio exists between population, capital, and space, of slaves, in any numbers, who have been made free, executing the necessary duties of tropical sugar labour for wages, or for any other consideration that could be supplied by the master, consistently with the maintenance of his necessary and average profits; and those who are reasonable amongst them, are prepared to relax all their claims for compensation, and all their objections to manumission, if a precedent could be produced, so as fairly to demonstrate *even the probability of such a result*. In this country, where the advantages of property are so well appreciated, artificers who receive very high wages, and who can live very comfortably on the wages of three days per week, are very often found to pass the other three days in idleness, rather than employ them for the increase of their property, which increase necessarily involves "*the bettering of their condition*;" that is, in other words, they prefer present enjoyment to the acquisition of property, even when the inconvenience incurred by such exertion is incalculably less than that which is felt by the labourer in a tropical climate. In fact, the objection to manumission rests upon the uncertainty of obtaining that supply of labour which is necessary for the cultivation of their estates, and the absence of which must involve them in one common ruin. In reasoning thus upon general principles, there may be many exceptions; it is sufficient that the general reasoning be in itself correct and unanswerable.

The preceding observations, it is hoped, have sufficiently established the justice of a principle of compensation. It yet remains to be considered whether that principle be not unequivocally included in the manumission clauses of the Trinidad order. Those clauses provide that, where the master and the slave cannot agree upon the terms of manumission, one appraiser shall be appointed by the owner, another by the protector, and an umpire by the chief judge, who shall value the slave, and on the payment of the appraised value into the treasury, such slave shall be manumitted. But it does not appear upon what principle such value shall be assessed. In the preceding argument, an endeavour has been made to show that the real value of a slave to his master must depend upon the facility or impossibility of substituting free labour for the labour of such slave. Consequently, if the value of the slave be determined upon the only equitable principle which appears to belong to the transaction, namely the deterioration of the property of the master, the price of such slave must carry with it the most equitable principle of compensation. In every special instance the appraisers will necessarily have to consider and to estimate the loss to the master. That loss will be measured by a comparison between the profit which the labour of that slave produced to his master, after deducting the expense of his maintenance, and the profit which the master will derive from the labour of a free black, after deducting the wages which it will be necessary to give, in order to induce such free black to execute the duties previously performed by that slave ; and the price will be raised or depressed accordingly, under a rigid application of this principle. The case in which there will be the highest amount of compensation will be that in which the services of the slave can neither be replaced by the purchase of another slave within the colony, (the only opportunity for such purchase permitted by law,) or by the services of a free black labourer ; and in that case, the principle of compensation will extend to a definite proportion of the property of the planter, who will be obliged to throw out of culti-

vation part of that soil, which, from its extent and fertility, is a mere drug, (as is the case in Demerara), but from which he is incapable of deriving any adequate advantage, except through the instrumentality of labour. But in such a supposed case, if the ground will admit of being employed for other purposes than that of the production of sugar, producing a certain, though a diminished rate of profit, the difference between such diminished profit and that which he derived from sugar-cultivation, will be the measure of the price of his slave. In the opposite case, the planter will receive little or nothing for his slave. If it can be shown that he can substitute free-labour for slave-labour with any proportionate profit, he has not any pretext for any compensation; but it is time, and time only that can dispose of this question; and if this experiment be pressed on before circumstances have provided a fund of free-labour, and if the planter be called upon, under this clause, to part with a slave, for whose services he cannot find a substitution, in that case, as already observed, the price of the slave must be the price of a definite proportion of the estate of the planter, including his capital. Nor can the extreme abolitionist complain with justice, that the price will be so inordinate as to frustrate the purposes of the enactment; for he will contend that free-labour will supply the place of slave-labour, with infinitely greater benefit both to the planter and to the slave. There is no human being possessed of proper feeling, who will not sincerely wish that this prediction may be verified; and if it be verified, the price of the manumission of the slave, as already explained, will and ought to be little more than nominal. Who is there in this country who would exchange the paid services of a free labourer for the services of a slave, if it were possible to suppose that the transaction would be legal? The most sensitive abolitionist may be assured that the best interests of the planter would induce him, under similar circumstances, to prefer free-labour to slave-labour, whatever may be his conduct, his speeches, or his protests against any change in the condition of slavery. The supposition that the price of the slave will include a definite

proportion of the value of the planter's estate, is founded in the presumed fact that the planter cannot purchase another slave—that he cannot purchase another labourer—that his land is a drug. If, then, he has a property of a hundred slaves, their value must be estimated in a ratio according to their relative powers and capacities ; and the loss to the master, if one slave were taken from a gang of a hundred, would not be the loss of a hundredth proportion of his property, but of the value of that slave with reference to the whole of his property. Let us suppose that, under this clause, a slave demands his manumission—that he has proofs of industry to warrant that demand,—and that he is prepared, from private sources, with adequate means for paying the price of his manumission. If a price which can command a slave *equally good* be given to the planter, he is precisely in the same condition as before. Under that supposition, he receives in fact no money ; since the money paid by the manumitted slave is immediately laid out in the purchase of another slave. If such a slave be not forthcoming, and he can only procure an *inferior slave*, he will have the services of that inferior slave, and a money-price representing the difference. If *no slave* whatever can be bought, he will have a money-price calculated with reference to his being able, by means of wages, to obtain from a freeman that labour which he had previously received from the slave ; and if the slave so manumitted, or any other free labourer, will work for those wages, no injury will be sustained by the master ; but if the master *can neither purchase a slave nor obtain free-labour*, his compensation for the loss of the manumitted slave ought to be, as before observed, a definite proportion of the value of the estate as a sugar plantation, deducting its value for any other available purpose of cultivation. It is between the two extremes—absolute compensation where no free-labour *can* be substituted, and the absence of all compensation in consequence of the ready substitution of free-labour—that *the various means will* be struck, which will regulate the practical execution of this clause. There may be colonies in the

West Indies, where the effect of this principle will not be to raise the price, inasmuch as local circumstances will compel the manumitted slave, from the want of subsistence, to work as a free labourer ; but even this will be an operation of time. Can any man, then, in fairness contend that the price of the slave is to be formed on one general average? Can any one hesitate to allow, that if the interests of property are to be preserved, the price must be regulated by the injury sustained by the master in the loss of the slave, rather than by the abstract value of the labour of the slave taken on a general average?

If it be suggested as an objection, that the planter may lose a slave, whose skill in a particular employment, and acquaintance with the circumstances of the estate, may render the loss of his services irreparable by the substitution of the labour of a stranger, —the answer is, that the planter must endeavour to train up, among his own slaves, a succession of persons who may be ready to replace any such valuable men, whenever they may be abstracted from the estate under the operation of this clause.

The purchase of children is not inconsistent with the principles which have been explained. The slave child, in the earlier years of its existence, is necessarily a source of expense, and not of profit to the planter. It is his future labour which is to compensate to the planter for the expense of his maintenance and support. If, therefore, an adequate price be offered in the extreme infancy of the child, there is no reason why the planter should object to receive the money, more than in the case of a slave of mature age. If it were enacted that, independently of the price so received, the slave child should be brought up by the planter, and apprenticed for a period of years, during which his labour, not as a slave, but as a coerced freeman, should compensate for the expense of his support, —the price paid would be a remuneration to the planter, for having dispossessed himself of his right to the contingent services of that slave child at the period of the

maturity of its strength, and of the interest which he had in its posterity. It will be observed that, under such a system of purchase, although the operation would necessarily be more slow, the price for the emancipation of the individual would be less ; and the apprenticeship of the child, thus made free, would be the best preparation for his future industry as a freeman. This, on examination, will be found to be nothing more than the principle of purchasing a reversion, in which a smaller price is paid than would be paid at a future period. Practical difficulties may be found or pointed out in the details of a measure founded on these principles ; but the question here again presents itself—Can any plan of emancipation be suggested, involving a more sound or a *more* certain principle of compensation ?

It may be argued, indeed, that this principle will be unpopular, both with *some* abolitionists and with *some* planters, but it will be so, only with those abolitionists who contend that emancipation should be instantaneous, and with those planters who contend that manumissions should never be compulsory.

If it be argued that, unless free-labour can be immediately substituted for slave-labour, the purpose of the manumission clause will be frustrated, inasmuch as no slave will ever be able to work out his own freedom under the accession of price which will take place, the answer is, that *it is for this country, if it be sincere in its anxiety to put an end to slavery, to lend pecuniary assistance to such slaves for the accomplishment of that purpose.* Such pecuniary assistance may be conveniently regulated with reference to the industry and good conduct of slaves who may have partial means for their own manumission, in other words, to the proof which they have given of a disposition to execute, as free labourers, the duties of steady and continuous industry ; but the principle, in any conceivable case, is perfectly sound. The master will receive a compensation for his loss. *If the slave be not manumitted, the clause is a dead letter.* If he be manumitted, it is the soundest principle on which compensation

can operate. It is sound, because it is special and not general. It is sound, because it is progressive and not simultaneous. It is sound, because the earlier experiments will give the best commentary upon the means of carrying into effect the resolutions of the House of Commons. It is sound, because it will give the fairest opportunity of solving the intricate and serious problem of superseding a state of slavery by a state of freedom, without ruin or revulsion either to the master or to the slave.

If a patient examination be made of all the protests and proceedings of the West Indians, whether in legislative enactments, in colonial debates, or in private publications, since the resolutions proposed by Mr. Canning were passed in May, 1823, it will be apparent that their resistance to the meliorating measures suggested by the government is founded on the following principle. They contend that those resolutions not only contemplated, but sanctioned, "an equitable consideration of the interests of private property." They believe, or rather they have been induced to believe, that the government, from want of due consideration, have suggested measures of melioration, which, if carried into effect, would materially trench upon those interests. They have not heard the word *compensation* ever pronounced in Parliament, and they *most erroneously* suppose that a principle of compensation has not been secured; whereas the most equitable principle of compensation has already (as the preceding observations have endeavoured to establish) been supplied in the clauses of the Trinidad Order in Council, which regulates the principle of manumission. Against that clause they have repeated the most constant and inveterate protests, expressed with too much apparent sincerity, to allow it to be supposed *that they have not misconstrued its tenor and effect*. It would appear, therefore, but just, that, as preliminary to any measures partaking even of the nature of direct authority, the tendency and bearing of the regulations suggested for their adoption should be still more fully and definitively explained to them. Not that

it is to be understood that no advance has been made towards the embodying the clauses of the **Trinidad Order** in the statute-books of some of the colonies. The extent to which this has taken place, it is presumed, will be made public, if papers of the same description as those of the last year should again be laid before **Parliament**.

THE END.

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